Philosophy of History: Meaning, Progress, and the Critique of Historicism
Does history have a meaning? A thread, a direction, perhaps even a law governing the succession of empires, revolutions, and ideas — or is history merely, as Macbeth put it, “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing”? This apparently simple question actually conceals two very different questions, and confusing them accounts for much of the muddle surrounding “philosophy of history.” The first question is speculative: what is the meaning, the motor, or the law of the historical process as a whole? The second is critical or epistemological: how do we know the past, what kind of science (if any) history is, and what it means to “understand” a human event. This article traces the most influential answers to the first question — from Augustine to Fukuyama — and shows how, in the twentieth century, the second question turned against the first, in a movement of suspicion running from Dilthey to Popper and Lyotard. ...