Ethics

Abelardo (Peter Abelard) The most brilliant and controversial intellectual of the 12th century. Also famous for his tragic love affair with Heloise (castrated by order of her uncle). He proposed conceptualism in the dispute over universals and introduced dialectical reason into theology. “I understand in order to believe” — reason must examine before accepting by faith (an inversion of Anselm of Canterbury). Born in Brittany into a family of the minor nobility, Abelard renounced his military inheritance to devote himself to the liberal arts, becoming an itinerant master who drew crowds of students to the schools of Paris. His career spans the decisive moment when teaching ceased to be a monopoly of the monasteries and migrated to the urban schools, foreshadowing the medieval university. A tireless polemicist, he challenged his own teacher William of Champeaux over the universals and later found himself in open conflict with the monastic authority embodied by Bernard of Clairvaux, who saw in his confidence in reason a danger to faith. This tension between dialectic and the contemplative tradition marks his entire body of work and helps explain the condemnations he suffered at ecclesiastical councils. ...

Adam Smith Scottish moral philosopher and economist, considered the father of modern political economy. A central figure of the Scottish Enlightenment and close friend of Hume. His work combines sentiment-based ethics with market theory. Before he became known as a theorist of economics, Smith was a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and it is from that chair that the core of his thought takes shape. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) he begins with a characteristically Enlightenment question: how do beings driven by their own interests come to make moral judgments and to care about others? His answer lies in sympathy — not a feeling of pity, but the capacity to imagine oneself in another’s situation — and in the “impartial spectator,” an inner tribunal that leads us to judge our own conduct as a well-informed and disinterested observer would. For Smith, morality derives neither from abstract reason nor from external commandments, but from this web of mutual affections and reciprocal judgments that sustains social life. ...

Alasdair MacIntyre Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–2025) was a Scottish-American moral philosopher, the author of one of the most influential works of twentieth-century moral philosophy, After Virtue (1981). His intellectual career was marked by a long pilgrimage: he set out from Marxism in his youth, passed through several positions, and ultimately converted to Catholicism and to Aristotelian Thomism in his maturity. He died in May 2025. MacIntyre diagnosed modern moral language as being in a state of grave disorder — composed of decontextualised fragments of traditions that have been lost — and argued that the “Enlightenment project” of providing an autonomous rational justification for morality had failed, clearing the way for emotivism. His proposal was the recovery of a virtue ethics of Aristotelian-Thomist roots, anchored in communal life and in traditions of enquiry. ...

Aristotle Born in Stagira, in Macedonia, around 384 BCE, the son of Nicomachus — physician to the Macedonian court — Aristotle entered Plato’s Academy at the age of seventeen, where he remained for some twenty years, until his master’s death. He later tutored Alexander the Great and, in 335 BCE, founded the Lyceum in Athens, a school whose members became known as Peripatetics (from their habit of discussing while walking). With Alexander’s death and the wave of anti-Macedonian feeling, he left Athens in 323 BCE — so that the city, according to ancient tradition, “might not sin twice against philosophy” — and died the following year in Chalcis. The body of texts we have inherited from him is the largest and most systematic of antiquity, spanning logic, physics, biology, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, and poetics. ...

Arthur Schopenhauer Born in Danzig in 1788, into a wealthy merchant family, Arthur Schopenhauer was able to devote himself to philosophy with financial independence. He earned his doctorate with On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813) and at thirty published his major work, The World as Will and Representation (1818) — which, however, was almost entirely ignored for decades. Hostile to the then-dominant Hegel, he even scheduled his lectures at the same hour as his rival’s in Berlin, to no audience. Recognition came only at the end of his life, in the 1850s. He was also the first major Western philosopher to engage seriously with Indian thought (the Upanishads and Buddhism). ...

Baruch Spinoza (Benedict of Spinoza) Born in Amsterdam in 1632, into a family of Sephardic Jews of Portuguese origin who had fled the Inquisition, Baruch Spinoza received a rabbinic education, but his ideas soon put him on a collision course with the community: in 1656 he was subjected to a herem (excommunication) of rare severity. He declined chairs and honors to preserve his independence of thought and supported himself humbly by grinding optical lenses. He died young, in 1677, and his principal works — among them the Ethics — were published only after his death. He is regarded as the most radical of the seventeenth-century rationalists. ...

Bernard Williams Bernard Williams was one of the most important British moral philosophers of the twentieth century and one of the most penetrating critics of the ambition to ground ethics in a single, impersonal theoretical system. He taught at Cambridge, Berkeley, and Oxford. Against both utilitarianism and Kantianism, Williams insisted on the irreducible complexity of moral life, on the importance of the first-person perspective, of personal commitments and emotions, and on the inability of grand theories to capture everything that matters ethically. His writing combines classical learning, psychological sensitivity, and an elegant distrust of philosophical oversimplification. ...

Buddha Note on sources and dating: The dates of Siddhārtha Gautama (also called Śākyamuni, “the sage of the Śākya clan”) are a matter of scholarly controversy. The traditional chronology places him at c. 563–483 BCE, but revised research of recent decades favours a “short chronology,” locating his death around 400 BCE (an approximate lifespan of c. 480–400 BCE). Equally important: the Buddha’s teachings were transmitted orally for generations and were only set down in writing centuries later, above all in the Pāli Canon (Tipiṭaka, Sanskrit Tripiṭaka). These texts are therefore not writings of the Buddha himself but later records of the monastic community, and reconstructing what he historically taught is a delicate philological task. ...

Carol Gilligan Carol Gilligan (born 1936 in New York) is an American psychologist and feminist, a professor at New York University (and earlier at Harvard). She is chiefly responsible for the formulation of the ethics of care, one of the most discussed contributions to contemporary moral philosophy, poised on the border between developmental psychology and ethics. Her starting point was a methodological critique. Working alongside the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, whose stages of moral development placed reasoning by abstract, universal principles at the top of the scale, Gilligan observed that these stages had been built from male samples and that, within them, women tended to “score” lower. Rather than conclude that there was a female deficiency, she reversed the question: what if there were here another moral voice, equally legitimate, that Kohlberg’s scale could not hear? ...

Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280–c. 207 BCE) was the third scholarch (head) of the Stoic school in Athens and is considered, alongside Zeno of Citium, the second founder of Stoicism. While Zeno founded the school and established its fundamental theses, it was Chrysippus who systematically elaborated Stoic logic, physics, and ethics, producing a monumental body of work that ancient tradition estimated at over 700 titles — almost all now lost. What we know of his thought comes from secondary sources: Diogenes Laërtius, Plutarch, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, and Epictetus. ...

Confucius (Chinese: Kǒngzǐ 孔子, “Master Kong”; Jesuit Latinisation: Confucius) was born in the state of Lu (present-day Shandong province, China) in 551 BCE and died in 479 BCE. He was a teacher, public official, and moral reformer who, after a life of frustrated political efforts, devoted himself to teaching and to the study of the ancient Chinese classics. His thought is known principally through the Lunyu (Analects 論語), a compilation of sayings and dialogues made by his disciples and the later tradition — the historicity of individual passages is a matter of debate among specialists. ...

David Hume A central figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711. While still very young he published his Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), a work that, in his own words, “fell dead-born from the press” and would be recognized only much later. His reputation as a skeptic in matters of religion cost him the university chairs he sought; he made his living as a librarian, a diplomatic secretary, and above all as a highly successful essayist and historian. A man of serene and amiable temperament — “le bon David” — he died in 1776, facing death with the tranquility of a sage. ...

Derek Parfit Derek Parfit (11 December 1942, Chengdu, China — January 2017, Oxford) was a British philosopher, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, regarded as one of the most important moral philosophers of the late twentieth century. He worked obsessively and almost ascetically, and published little — but each work left a deep mark on the philosophy of personal identity, rationality, and ethics. His Reasons and Persons (1984) is one of the landmark works of contemporary analytic philosophy. ...

Diogenes of Sinope “Diogenes the dog” (kynikós) — refoundaer and principal figure of Cynicism. He lived in a large ceramic jar (pithos) in Athens, reduced his needs to a minimum, and despised all social convention. He said he sought “a human being” (ἄνθρωπον) walking with a lantern lit in broad daylight. When Alexander the Great offered to grant him any desire, he asked only that he step out of his sunlight. He embodied radical anticultural philosophy: virtue requires total self-sufficiency, not abstract philosophy. ...

Elizabeth Anscombe Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1919–2001) was one of the most original analytic philosophers of the twentieth century. A student and close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein at Cambridge, she became one of his literary executors and translated his Philosophical Investigations (1953) into English — a rendering that remains canonical. A devout Catholic, she fused the rigour of the analytic tradition with an Aristotelian-Thomist sensibility that shaped her entire body of work. Her monograph Intention (1957) is widely regarded as the founding text of contemporary philosophy of action, while her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) is commonly identified as the starting point of the virtue ethics revival in the Anglophone world. She taught at Oxford and, from 1970, held the chair of philosophy at Cambridge once occupied by Wittgenstein. ...

Emmanuel Lévinas Lithuanian-French philosopher, one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century. He introduced Husserl and Heidegger to France, but later critically surpassed them. A Holocaust survivor, he developed a philosophy where ethics is first philosophy — prior to ontology. Key Concepts The Face (le visage): the manifestation of the Other that addresses me and demands a response — not a physical face, but an ethical presence that says “thou shalt not kill”; the point from which all moral responsibility emerges Ethics as first philosophy: against Heidegger, for whom ontology (being) is the foundation of everything — for Lévinas, the ethical relation with the Other precedes and grounds all ontology Radical alterity (autrui): the Other cannot be reduced to the same, cannot be fully understood or assimilated — this irreducibility is the fundamental ethical fact Totality and Infinity: Western philosophy tends toward “totalization” — engulfing the different within the same. The Infinite breaks into this totality through the face of the Other, resisting capture Infinite responsibility: I am responsible for the Other asymmetrically and without reciprocity — “I am responsible even for what I did not do”; responsibility precedes freedom Il y a (there is): the experience of anonymous, impersonal, threatening being — the murmur of being before any existent; the night in which being becomes unbearable Saying and Said (le Dire / le Dit): “Saying” is ethical exposure to the Other, the act of address; the “Said” is propositional content — ethics resides in the Saying, which the Said always betrays Influenced by Husserl — phenomenology (was his student and translator) Heidegger — fundamental ontology (later critically surpassed) Bergson — philosophy of duration and life Jewish tradition (Talmud, Rosenzweig, Buber) Influenced Derrida — deconstruction and ethics (debate on violence and metaphysics) Habermas — ethics and recognition of the other Judith Butler — vulnerability and ethical responsibility Contemporary Christian and Jewish theology Postcolonial studies and recognition theory Works Existence and Existents (1947); Totality and Infinity (1961); Otherwise than Being (1974); Ethics and Infinity (1982). ...

Enrique Dussel Born in Mendoza, Argentina, in 1934, Enrique Dussel had a cosmopolitan formation — he studied in Argentina, Spain, France, and Germany, and also researched the history of the Church in Latin America. After a bomb attack on his home, he went into exile in Mexico in 1975, where he became a naturalized citizen and lived until his death, in 2023. He is the leading name of Latin American Liberation Philosophy and a central reference of decolonial thought. ...

Epictetus Phrygian ex-slave; the Stoic who most lived what he preached. His central distinction structures all Stoic ethics: what depends on us (eph’ hêmin: thoughts, impulses, judgments, desires) vs. what does not depend on us (ouk eph’ hêmin: body, fame, wealth, health). Inner freedom is absolute and cannot be taken by any master. “Bear and forbear” (anékhou kai apékhou). Born in Hierapolis, in Phrygia (modern Turkey), Epictetus spent his early years as a slave in Rome, in the service of Epaphroditus, a freedman connected to Nero’s court. It was in this setting that he studied under the Stoic Musonius Rufus, from whom he inherited the conviction that philosophy is worth only as much as it transforms conduct. He is said to have been lame — a condition he reportedly mentioned with serene indifference, a living example of his doctrine that disability touches the body, not the prohairesis, the will that chooses. Freed later in life, he devoted himself to teaching in Rome until the emperor Domitian expelled the philosophers from the city; he then moved to Nicopolis, in Epirus (northwestern Greece), where he founded a school that drew disciples from far and wide, including young men of the Roman elite. ...

Epicurus Born on the island of Samos around 341 BCE, Epicurus founded in Athens, in 307 BCE, the school known as the Garden (Kepos) — a community of friends that, remarkably for its time, welcomed women and slaves. He lived simply and in seclusion, and died around 270 BCE, facing with serenity the pains of a kidney ailment. His philosophy, heir to Socrates in the ideal of philosophy as an art of living, has a therapeutic aim: to free the human being from what disturbs their peace. ...

Frances Kamm Frances Myrna Kamm (b. c. 1947) is one of the most rigorous and influential moral philosophers working in the contemporary analytic tradition. She built her academic career at institutions including NYU, Rutgers, and Harvard, where she taught for many years at both the Kennedy School of Government and the philosophy department. Her central intellectual project is the development of a non-consequentialist theory of moral rights and permissible harm that is at once normatively precise and methodologically transparent. Against ethical frameworks that evaluate actions solely by their outcomes, Kamm argues that there are genuine deontological constraints — moral structures that determine what may be done to a person regardless of how much overall good such an act would produce. ...